UK Secrecy Fight Puts Apple iCloud Order Before Tribunal

A courtroom fight over an alleged UK demand for Apple iCloud access has moved beyond the existence of the order itself.

In Computer Weekly’s account of the hearing, campaigners pressed the Investigatory Powers Tribunal to decide whether the Home Office can still rely on official silence after politicians, officials and earlier reporting have already put the dispute in public view.

Ben Jaffey KC, appearing for Privacy International and Liberty, called the government’s neither-confirm-nor-deny stance “farcical”.

His argument was that the secrecy formula no longer fits a case where Apple, US officials, UK reporting and the investigatory powers commissioner have all left public traces around the same technical capability notice.

The tribunal is considering Apple’s complaint alongside the challenge from the two campaign groups.

Both actions concern the home secretary’s authority to issue secret technical capability notices, or TCNs, to technology companies.

The wider policy question is whether encrypted services can be compelled to assist lawful access while the existence of a specific order remains officially unacknowledged.

The Home Office says the answer must remain yes.

Government submissions warned that confirming or denying a TCN would damage national security and could help terrorists, serious criminals or online abusers work out which services are safest for hiding activity.

Neil Sheldon KC, for the government, argued that the secretary of state’s assessment was not irrational and that the court could proceed on assumed facts without breaching national security.

Jaffey built the challenge around the public chronology.

The Washington Post disclosed that the Home Office had issued Apple a notice in January 2025 over encrypted iCloud material held by customers worldwide.

Apple then removed Advanced Data Protection from the UK, saying it had never created a backdoor or master key for its products and never would.

A later notice in October 2025 was reported as a narrower demand focused on British users.

The campaigners argued that later disclosures weakened the government’s position further.

Home Office sources were cited by the Times as confirming the existence of the order, while US political figures also referred to it publicly.

Former US director of national intelligence Tulsi Gabbard wrote on X in August 2025 that Britain had agreed to drop a mandate that would have let Apple expose protected encrypted data belonging to Americans.

That public record matters because Apple is not in the same position as companies that can deny receiving such orders.

WhatsApp and Google have stated in witness evidence that they have not received TCNs.

Jaffey’s case was that Apple’s withdrawal of ADP from Britain pointed in the other direction, while legal restrictions stopped the company from spelling that out.

The hearing also exposed friction inside the secrecy framework.

Jaffey questioned why any unofficial confirmation by government sources had not produced visible leak investigations, and he cited comments attributed to officials from the then Department for Science, Innovation and Technology that criticised the Home Office handling of the Apple case.

The investigatory powers commissioner, Brian Leveson, had also written in a December 2025 report that lawful access could be balanced with strong encryption.

Sheldon warned that a single departure from NCND would make the policy harder to maintain in later cases, allowing people to infer where notices had or had not been served.

Apple’s counsel, Daniel Beard KC, rejected the government’s suggestion that assumed facts carried no real consequence.

The tribunal has already allowed open hearings despite Home Office evidence claiming that publicity about the proceedings would damage national security.

The next question is whether that openness can survive contact with the disputed order’s actual history.