Bonzo Lend Pauses Hedera Pool After $9.05 Million Oracle Exploit
Bonzo Finance Labs said a third-party Supra oracle verification flaw let Wallet A borrow about $9.05 million from its Hedera lending pool after a manipulated SAUCE price update. The pool remains paused, while reimbursement terms, withdrawal timing and final recovery accounting remain outside the public record.
Bonzo Lend has paused its Hedera lending pool after an oracle-verification exploit let a wallet borrow assets far beyond the value of its posted SAUCE collateral.
This article is based on Bonzo Finance Labs company material published in coordination with the Bonzo Finance Foundation; vendor claims need attribution and recovery figures have not been independently verified.
Bonzo Finance Labs attributed the July 11, 2026 incident on Hedera mainnet to a third-party Supra oracle verification path, not to the lending-pool code.
Hedera Lending Pool Pauses After Oracle Exploit
The lending pool remains paused while the team decides when liquidity providers can withdraw and when normal operation can resume.
Bonzo Points is also paused, while Vaults, Bridge and single-sided $BONZO/$XBONZO staking were listed as unaffected.
In Bonzo's incident report, Wallet A deposited 250 SAUCE before a manipulated price update was accepted by the third-party oracle's on-demand contract.
That abnormal update made the small SAUCE deposit appear far more valuable to the lending protocol than it was.
At 00:51 UTC, Wallet A submitted the manipulated price update for pair 425, according to the incident timeline.
Records in the report show the account borrowed 6,634,528.202695 USDC and 34,518,389.36109841 WHBAR within seconds.
Zero-Signature Oracle Verification Drove The Borrowing
The oracle verifier accepted a proof with no valid signature.
The submitted update referenced committee ID 2 and carried a zeroed signature value of [0,0] where the committee's BLS signature should have appeared.
Hedera's pairing precompile, system contract 0.0.8, returned true because both the submitted signature point and the referenced committee public key were zero.
The missing validation step was rejection of zero, identity and off-subgroup inputs before a true pairing result was treated as a valid committee signature.
Supra acknowledged the issue and deployed a fix to the affected verifier contract on Hedera mainnet.
Bonzo's incident report describes the lending protocol as reading the recorded oracle value, computing collateral value and borrowing capacity from that value, and not submitting anything to the feed itself.
Wallet A Borrowed $9.05 Million In Principal
Bonzo's official report states that all listed figures used an HBAR reference price of $0.06998 and treated USDC as $1.00.
The filing also puts Wallet A's extracted principal at approximately $9.05 million and total principal borrowed during the incident at approximately $10.06 million before recovery items.
A second account, Wallet B, borrowed roughly $1.0 million while the abnormal price remained active.
The team described Wallet B as having contacted it through Discord, identified itself as a white-hat responder and indicated that it intended to return the funds, so those borrowings are being treated as a recovery matter rather than part of the headline loss estimate.
The remaining public-record gaps are a reimbursement plan, final loss accounting, withdrawal timetable, conditions for lifting the lending-pool pause, recovered-asset totals and completed reconciliation of Wallet B's stated return.
