Defcon Badge Makes Open Security Chip Inspectable As Hardware Token
WIRED via Ars Technica reported that Defcon's 2026 badge uses Andrew Huang's Baochip-1x, a mostly open source microcontroller with a removable module that works as a hardware security token and exposes the silicon for infrared inspection.
A new Defcon conference badge is turning the event's collectible hardware into an inspection test for open security silicon, with WIRED via Ars Technica reporting that the removable core module can continue working after the conference as a hardware security token.
The badge was designed by hardware hacker Andrew Huang around Baochip-1x, a mostly open source microcontroller that has been in development for three years, according to WIRED via Ars Technica.
Public Baochip repositories expose the device software stack, processor implementation, crypto components and I/O design, giving researchers a reference design to compare against the shipped device.
Transparent Packaging Targets Supply Chain Trust
The security claim rests on inspection rather than only published code.
Baochip-1x is packaged so infrared light can pass through the back of the silicon, allowing researchers to look at internal structures and compare the physical chip with the public design files.
That packaging changes the usual trust model for hardware tokens.
Conventional chips and earlier open source silicon projects may publish specifications while still hiding the manufactured die inside opaque plastic, leaving buyers to trust that fabrication or packaging did not introduce an unexpected component.
The Defcon badge gives attendees a removable module that can be examined, carried away and reused.
Badge Distribution Becomes Field Testing
Defcon founder Jeff Moss backed the badge because the conference theme centers on agency, and WIRED via Ars Technica reported that the 27,000 badges represent Baochip's first major distribution.
The rollout moves the project from a small development release into the hands of a community that is likely to inspect, modify and attack it.
The module can act as a FIDO hardware security token and supports time-based one-time passwords and password management.
It also includes a low-resolution camera for QR-code enrollment, while the default software uses black-and-white data and avoids photo storage to fit Defcon's privacy rules.
Open Design Does Not Remove All Risk
Baochip-1x runs a Rust operating system, while The report listed secure boot, hardware attack resistance and a true random number source among the design features.
Huang also pointed to resistive RAM as a memory choice intended to make physical extraction harder than conventional flash storage.
proprietary low-level physical-design and manufacturing elements tied to TSMC's 22-nanometer process remain closed, and the project still depends on users trusting parts of the fabrication chain that cannot be published in the same way as software.
The report said Huang's estimate that attacks costing tens of thousands of dollars may be within the chip's defensive range, but a multimillion-dollar laboratory effort would probably break it.
The badge therefore becomes a public stress test for how much verifiable silicon can fit into a mass conference device.
The technical headroom leaves room for post-conference use beyond badge puzzles.
Baochip-1x uses a 350 MHz RISC-V processor, 2 megabytes of SRAM, 4 megabytes of RRAM and four 700 MHz PicoRV32 input-output cores, with MicroPython plus C and Rust development kits already available.
Defenders and hardware researchers now have a visible target for checking whether open inspection can improve authentication hardware without overstating what any chip can prove.
